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LABOR LAW
Pretext or pretext-plus: What must a plaintiff prove
to win a Title VII lawsuit?
by Barbara J. Fick
St. Mary's Honor Center
V.
Melvin Hicks
(Docket No. 92-602)
Argument Date: April 20, 1993
ISSUE
This case raises questions relating to proof issues and the
structure of a disparate treatment case involving employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Specifically, the Court will decide whether, as a matter of law,
the plaintiff prevails upon proof that the legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reasons advanced by the defendant as its motives
for an adverse employment action are pretextual.
FACTS
Melvin Hicks, an African-American, was employed as a
correctional officer at Missouri's St. Mary's Honor Center, a
minimum security correctional facility, from 1978 to 1984.
In 1980, he was promoted to shift commander. In 1983, the
state official charged with overseeing St. Mary's began
receiving numerous complaints about how that facility was
being run. In January 1984, after an investigation, several of
the managerial personnel (not including Hicks) were either
transferred, demoted or terminated. John Powell, a white
employee, became the new chief of custody.
Prior to 1984, Hicks had a consistently satisfactory
employment record, and had never been disciplined. Once
Hicks was placed under Powell's supervision, however, he
was frequently disciplined. On April 19, 1984, Hicks was
demoted. After being informed of his demotion, Hicks had a
confrontation with Powell. Powell sought disciplinary action
against Hicks based on this confrontation, and Hicks was
eventually discharged.
Hicks filed a lawsuit in district court alleging that St.
Mary's Honor Center violated, among other things, Title VII
by demoting and discharging him because of his race. After
trial, the district court found that Hicks had proven a prima
facie case of employment discrimination-he was a black
employee who had satisfactorily performed his job until
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Powell became his supervisor; he was demoted and then dis-
charged; and his job was subsequently filled by a white
employee. This evidence created a presumption that he had
been demoted and discharged because of his race. The court
also found that St. Mary's Honor Center had produced evi-
dence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions: that since January 1984 Hicks had been involved in
a series of violations of Center policy which were sufficient-
ly severe to justify demotion, and that the accumulation of
violations over a short period of time, coupled with the seri-
ousness of the confrontation with Powell, justified discharge.
Hicks proved, however, that the employer's explanations
were pretextual. According to the court, other employees had
been involved in similar, and in some cases more serious,
violations of Center policy and had not been disciplined.
Moreover, the court found that Powell had "manufactured
the confrontation between [Hicks] and himself in order to
terminate" Hicks. The court held, however, that while Hicks
had proven that he was treated more harshly than his co-
workers, he had failed to prove that the reason was racially,
rather than personally, motivated. Thus, while Hicks proved
that the reasons given by St. Mary's for his demotion and
discharge were pretextual, he still had the ultimate burden to
prove that race was the reason. Since, in the court's view,
Hicks failed to prove the demotion and discharge were moti-
vated by race, it entered judgment in favor of St. Mary's.
756 F.Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
Hicks appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed. 970
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992). The appellate court ruled that
"[o]nce plaintiff proved all of the defendants' proffered rea-
sons for the adverse employment action to be pretextual,
plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Having
proving that all of the defendants' explanations were not
true, the plaintiff had satisfied his ultimate burden of persua-
sion that the real reason was illegal discrimination. No addi-
tional proof of unlawful motive was required.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether proof of pretext alone is sufficient to satisfy plain-
tiff's burden of proof in a disparate treatment case or whether
plaintiff must prove pretext plus some additional evidence of
unlawful motive.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Since 1973, the Supreme Court has been repeatedly
called upon to define and refine the structure of an indirect-
evidence disparate treatment case under Title VII. Hicks
requires the Court to revisit the issue once again. The Court's
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decision will have important repercussions on plaintiffs' and
defendants' relative ability to win a Title VII lawsuit.
The central issue in a disparate treatment case is whether
the employer is treating the plaintiff less favorably than other
employees with regard to hiring, firing, terms and conditions
of employment because of race, sex, religion, national origin
or color. Motive is the key issue: is the employer's action
motivated by an illegal consideration? But motive is rarely
capable of proof by direct evidence. Seldom will the employ-
er state that the reason for its decision is the plaintiff's race.
Thus, the plaintiff is often required to use indirect evidence
to prove the employer's motive.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could estab-
lish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by
proving: I) that he belonged to a protected class; 2) that he
was satisfactorily performing his job; 3) that he was fired;
and 4) that the employer hired another employee to fill plain-
tiff's job. This indirect evidence creates a presumption that
the motive behind the employer's action is illegal discrimina-
tion because "when all legitimate reasons for [firing] an
[employee] have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer,
who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based
his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race."
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
The presumption of illegal motive created by the indirect
evidence can be rebutted, however, if the employer presents
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. The employer "need not persuade the court that it
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Once the employer presents its reasons, the plaintiff, in rebut-
tal, has the opportunity to prove that the reasons advanced by
the employer are not the real reasons for the employer's
actions. This is known as pretext. "The burden [of proving
pretext] now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that [plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional
discrimination." Id.
Hicks questions the nature of the plaintiff's burden in the
rebuttal stage of the litigation. If the plaintiff proves pretext,
does this mean, a fortiori, that the plaintiff has met the ulti-
mate burden of persuading the court that he or she has been a
victim of intentional discrimination? Or must plaintiff pro-
duce evidence to prove not only that the employer's reasons
were pretextual but also additional evidence that illegal dis-
crimination is involved?
In the Burdine case, the Court's opinion stated that the
plaintiff could meet the ultimate burden of persuasion "either
by directly persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of cre-
dence." This language seemed to suggest that plaintiff's
proof of pretext alone was sufficient to win a Title VII law-
suit. Indeed, Justices Blackmun and Brennan in a concurring
opinion filed in United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), interpreted the
passage from Burdine in this manner: "the McDonnell
Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when at
the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates that the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is
in fact not the true reason for the employment decision." This
is the analysis applied by the Eighth Circuit in the Hicks case.
Several circuit courts of appeal, however, have not read
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of cases in this manner.
For example, the Seventh Circuit has held that proof of pre-
text, while strong evidence of discriminatory intent, does not
compel the conclusion that the employer acted for a discrimi-
natory reason. The court "may conclude after hearing all the
evidence that neither discriminatory intent nor the employer's
explanation accounts for the decision." Benzies v. Illinois
Dept. of Mental Health and Dev. Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146
(7th Cir. 1987). Thus, upon proof of pretext a court may find
for the plaintiff but is not required to do so. In fact, this is the
analysis used by the district court in the Hicks case.
Should the Supreme Court adopt the analysis advanced
by the Seventh Circuit and the district court in Hicks, an
additional hurdle will be placed in the paths of plaintiffs
attempting to prove disparate treatment under Title VII. The
purpose served by the employer's defense is "to frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will
have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."
Burdine. Under the Seventh Circuit's analysis, if the employ-
er has a reason for its action which it fails to disclose, thus
depriving plaintiff of his full and fair opportunity to rebut,
the employer may still prevail. The plaintiff will be in the
position of guessing at other motives the employer may have
had for its actions, and disproving them as well.
ARGUMENTS
For St. Mary's Honor Center (Counsel of Record, Gary L.
Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, PO Box 899, Jefferson
City, MO 65102; telephone (314) 751-3321):
1. The issue of motive is factual. When the employer
rebuts the legal presumption raised by the plaintiff's
prima facie case, the presumption of discrimination
drops from the case and the court must look to all the
facts to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to prove that the employer's motive was illegal. Proving
that the reason given by the employer is a pretext does
not prove that it is a pretextfor illegal discrimination.
2. The court, in reviewing the entire record, may find other
evidence of lawful reasons to support the employer's
action even though the employer itself did not advance
the evidence as the basis for its action. The employer
does not have to persuade the court that it was in fact
motivated by the reasons which it advances. The burden
of persuasion is on the plaintiff to prove the employer's
motive is an illegal one.
3. The decision of the Eighth Circuit misapprehends the
nature of the legal presumption created by the prima
facie case. The Eighth Circuit held that once the plaintiff
Issue No. 8
proves the employer's proffered reasons are pretext, the
presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie
case is resurrected; it is as though the employer had
offered no evidence to rebut the presumption since the
evidence it did offer turned out to be false. However, the
Supreme Court in Burdine clearly held that once the
prima facie case has been rebutted by the employer, the
presumption drops from the case, and "the factual inquiry
proceeds to a new level of specificity"-whether the
employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.
For Melvin Hicks (Counsel of Record, Charles R. Oldham,
317 N. l1th Street, STE 1220, St. Louis, MO 63101; tele-
phone (314) 231-0464):
1. The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine struc-
ture of proof is "progressively to sharpen the inquiry into
the elusive factual question of intentional discrimina-
tion." Burdine. The purpose for requiring the employer to
produce clear and reasonably specific evidence of its rea-
sons is to narrow the possible explanations which the
plaintiff must rebut. The litigation can then focus on the
specific reasons advanced by the employer.
2. Allowing a court to base its decision on reasons not
advanced by the employer deprives a plaintiff of his full
and fair opportunity to prove his or her case.
3. The employer is in the best position to know its motives
for its own actions. The adversarial system is based on
the premise that the litigants will present the facts and
arguments most favorable to their own case. The court
should not give the employer the benefit of justifications
on which the employer itself deliberately chooses not to
rely. Such a rule would undermine the truth-seeking
function of a trial and squander judicial resources.
4. In Burdine the Supreme Court held that if the employer
offers no evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son in response to the plaintiff's prima facie case, a court
must enter judgment for the plaintiff. When the employer
produces evidence of a particular reason, it creates an
issue of fact with regard to that specific reason. Once
plaintiff proves that reason to be a pretext, there is no
longer any evidence to rebut the presumption of discrimi-
nation created by the prima facie case. An employer who
advances a false reason should be in no better position
that the employer who offers no reason at all.
5. Imposing a pretext-plus standard on plaintiffs in effect
imposes a duty to prove disparate treatment cases by
direct evidence. The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line of
cases clearly provides for proof of motive by indirect evi-
dence. Burdine held that a plaintiff may demonstrate pre-
text "either directly by persuading the court that a dis-
criminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence." Those circuits
adopting the pretext plus standard have effectively over-
looked Burdine's alternative of proof by either direct or
indirect evidence. Instead they require plaintiff to prove
both that the employer's explanation is unworthy of credence
(pretext) and that a discriminatory reason more likely moti-
vated the employer (plus).
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of St. Mary's Honor Center
The Equal Employment Advisory Council (Counsel of
Record, Douglas S. McDowell; McGuiness & Williams,
1015 Fifteenth Street, NW, STE 1200, Washington, DC
20005; telephone (202) 789-8600).
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America (Counsel of Record, Mona C. Zeiberg, National
Chamber Litigation Center, Inc., 1615 H Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20062; telephone (202) 463-5337).
Washington Legal Foundation and Equal Opportunity
Foundation (Counsel of Record, Richard A. Samp,
Washington Legal Foundation, 1705 N Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20036; telephone (202) 857-0240).
The National Association of Manufacturers (Counsel of
Record, Glenn D. Nager; Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 1450
G. Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005; telephone (202) 879-
3939):
Not only was the Eighth Circuit incorrect in holding that
judgment for plaintiff was required by law, but if plaintiff
has only proven that the employer's proffered motives were
false without also proving the employer's real reason was
illegal discrimination, judgment must be entered for the
employer. In a series of cases decided in 1986, the Supreme
Court ruled that a party's failure to prove an essential ele-
ment of its case, for which it bears the burden of proof,
mandates the entry of summary judgment against that
party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475
U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986).
The substantive law of employment discrimination
imposes on the plaintiff the burden of proof on the ultimate
issue in the case: whether the defendant was motivated by
illegal discrimination. Where the plaintiff only proves that
the reason articulated by the defendant as its motive is
untrue, the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential ele-
ment of its case-that the real motive was a prohibited one.
Thus, the court must enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
In Support of Melvin Hicks
National Employment Lawyers Association (Counsel of
Record, Janette Johnson, Law Offices of Janette Johnson,
3614 Fairmount Street, STE 100, Dallas, TX 75219; tele-
phone (214) 522-4090).
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, et al.
(Counsel of Record, Colleen McMahon; Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, 1285 Avenue of the Americas,
New York, NY 10019; telephone (212) 373-3000).
The United States (Counsel of Record, William C.
Bryson, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice,
Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 514-2217).
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